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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

GERALD GUNDRY and B R Y C E
TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
STATE OF UTAH; LOUIS DOMENKO, Fiscal Officer, Utah Highway
Patl'ol; LYLE HYATT, Commander,
Utah Highway Patrol; and CLAIR
R. HOPKINS, Chairman, Utah Commissioner of Finance,

Case No.
10090

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiffs-appellants filed an action for declaratory judgment in the Third District Court of the State of
Utah, regarding interpretation of 49-8-1 to 49-8-5, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was heard on the lOth day of January,
1964, before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, and at that
time the plaintiffs-appellants were denierl any recovery of
contributions made to the Retirement System of the Utah
Highway Patrol.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants-respondents seek affirmance of the
judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants-respondents accept the statement of facts
as set forth in the appellants' brief. The amounts in contest are $1,048.12 for appellant Gerald Gundry and $884.25 for appellant Bryce Taylor, which represent the amounts
of their contributions to the Utah Highway Patrol Retirement Fund. There is no dispute as to these amounts, and
the only questions to be resolved are the interpretation
and intent of Title 49, Chapter 8, Sections 1-5, of the Utah
Code Annotated 1953, and whether or not the appellants
did agree to the deduction on the basis that they would not
be refundable unless retirement age was reached.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS
INTERPRETATION OF TITLE 49, CHAPTER
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a
8, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, DENYING
THE APPELLANTS ANY REFUND OF THEIR
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HIGHWAY P ATROL RETIREMENT FUND.
In Section 49-8-4, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, the qualifications and exemptions are set forth as the only exclusive manner in which any benefits or payments from the
Highway Patrol Retirement Fund may be made. Furthermore, the last sentence of the first paragraph of that section states:

* * *

The highway patrol must keep this
fund intact and in the amount necessary to meet
the payments as determined by the actuarial system." (Emphasis added.)
11

It must be concluded, therefore, that the Legislature
did not intend for any contributions to be returned or payments made, other than those specified in this section, to
any employee or his legal representative who did not satisfy
the qualifications of the section heretofore mentioned.
In the book by Crawford, Interpretation of Law, Section 195, pages 334 and 335, he states:
"As a general rule, in the interpretation of
statutes, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. It therefore logically follows
that if a statute enumerates the things upon which
it is to operate, everything else must necessarily,
and by implication, be excluded from its operation
and effect. * * * If the statute directs that
certain acts shall be done in a specified manner, or
by a certain person, their performance in any other
manner than that specified or by any other person
than one of those named, is impliedly prohibited."
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This is a general rule of statutory construction and is widely followed throughout the federal and state courts. See
N elden v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 Pac. 524 ( 1899); Havemeyer v. Superior Court, 84 Calif. 327, 24 Pac. 121; Page
V. Allen, 58 Pa. St. 338.
A general maxim of statutory construction is the general presumption that a court gives to the constitutionality
and validity of a statute duly passed by a legislature until
clear and convincing evidence of its invalidity or unconstitutionality is established. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol 2, Sec. 4106, p. 288. Also see Gravell v. Benson,
285 U. S. 22, 76 L. Ed. 598, 52 Sup. Ct. 285.
It is always incumbent upon any court when called
upon to interpret a statute or statutes to strive to avoid
a construction or interpretation which will tend to make
the statute ineffective or unproductive or not achieve the
most good as it is presumed that the Legislature wanted
in the passage of the particular act. In this instance, pursuant to a 1960 actuary study which had been accomplished,
pursuant to Section 49-8-5, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, by
Walter C. Green, Actuary, the Legislature had been advised by the Utah Highway Patrol that it would increase
the contribution of the employees to allow and make feasible and make actuarially sound the refunding or paying
back of contributions to Utah Highway Patrol employees
who quit or did not qualify under the retirement provisions
of this act.
The actuary estimated an increase of 1.68% of salary
would be required to afford the repayment of contributions
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on page 9 of the June 30, 1960 Actuarial Report. This
would have increased the Utah Highway Patrol's contribution from 7.26/o to 8.94% of salary, which the actuary
n\commended but the Highway Patrol male employees
voted and refused the proposal.
It is also noteworthy that when the 1961 Legislature
amended Section 49-8-4, no provision was made for the
refund of any contributions other than those specified in
the amendment in Section 49-8-4, U. C. A. 1953, as
amended, and hence, by clear implication, the Legislature
refused to increase any donation by the State for refund
of contributions.
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Vol. 2,
Sec. 4702, page 334, states:
"There is no safer nor better settled canon of
interpretation than that when language is clear
and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it
plainly expresses.''
There are several Utah cases which hold directly in
favor of the position of the defendants. The case of Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System Board of Adrninistration, et al., 122 Utah 44, 246 P. 2d 591, in which
it was alleged that the Retirement Act was abrogating the
vested rights of the plaintiff Hansen and/ or was, in fact,
unreasonably discriminatory, the Utah Supreme Court in
its decision clearly covered the points as follows :
"An act is never unconstitutional because of
discrimination, so long as there is some reasonable
basis for differentiation between classes which is
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related to the purposes to be accomplished by the
act, and so long as it applies uniformly to all persons within the class."
See Utah v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 920, 117 A. L.
R. 330; Slater v. Salt Lake City, 155 Utah 476, 206 P. 2d
153, 9 A. L. R. 2d 712. The court also stated in the Hansen
case:

"A county employee does not acquire vested
rights in a pension system prior to fulfillment of
the conditions required, but restraint should be
placed upon injustice which could eventuate from
permitting wholly unreasonable and arbitrary encroachments upon advantages which may have accrued to employees who have worked out subtantially all of necessary conditions prerequisite to
qualifying for a pension."
The court went on further to state:
"The overwhelming weight of authority is that
an employee such as Hansen who has neither served
the necessary years to qualify for a pension, nor
attained the retirement age, has no vested right in
the pension or the retirement system."
The court furthermore determined that this was not
discriminatory against defendant Hansen because the applicability was justified and stated as follows:

"* * * Our function is to determine whether
an enactment operates equally upon all persons similarly situated. If it does, then the discrimination
is within permissive legislative limits."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

The court also stated:

"* * * Length of service is a fair and logical criterion by which to classify employees under
retirement systems and the liquidation thereof."
Thus, it will be noted that the Utah Supreme Court
definitely ruled that an employee does not acquire vested
rights in a pension system prior to fulfillment of the statutory conditions which are set forth for qualification for
payment therefrom. Clearly, in the case at hand, neither
plaintiff has the statutory requirements to participate and,
hence, has no vested interest or right in the pension system or any contribution therein. See Gall v. City of Wheeling, et al., 192 S. E. 116. These funds, then, when contributed, were not placed in trust or in a fiduciary capacity
for the individual benefit of the plaintiffs herein, but were
placed in a specific fund to accomplish certain specific
functions for all those who comply and come under Section 49-8-4, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, heretofore mentioned and, therefore, are not personal moneys of the plaintiffs but are, in fact, public moneys to be used as designated by the Legislature in this act. See Gall v. City of
Wheeling, supra.
The Hansen case may be distinguished from a 1943
Utah case, Driggs v. Utah Teachers' Retirement Board,
105 Utah 417, 142 P. 2d 657, in which the court ruled:
"A school teacher, who was retired under
teachers' retirement act and had made the required
contributions and met the prescribed conditions,
had a 'vested right' in his whole retirement allowance as provided by the act at time of his retire-
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ment, and a subsequent amendment to the act could
not be construed as reducing amount to which
teacher was entitled." (Emphasis added.)
There is a difference between the Driggs case and the
facts of the case at hand. The plaintiffs, unlike the Driggs
case, have no vested interest whatsoever because they have
not met the prescribed conditions or qualifications as set
forth in the Highway Patrol Retirement System in Title
49, Chapter 8 of the Utah Code Annotated. Furthermore,
the 1961 amendment to Section 49-8-4, U. C. A. 1953, did
not alter the retirement program at all but merely made
provision for additional retirement pay, and, did not jeopardize or reduce in any way any retirement and even allowed the contributions of an employee who had not qualified to be refunded to his legal representative.
In a later case, Backman v. Bateman, 1 U. 2d 153, 263
P. 2d 561 (1953), the Utah Supreme Court further stated:

"* * * But until a member fulfills all the
conditions precedent, he has no vested right to a
pension or an annuity and the system may be abolished leaving him without the expectancy of a pension. Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System, Utah, 246 P. 2d 591."
Chief Justice Wolfe further went on to state, in a concurring opinion in the Backman case :

"* * *

If a member voluntarily leaves the
employ of the district in which the association to
which he belongs has been organized; if he leaves
because the board of education does not renew his
contract; or if he dies while a member but leaves
no dependent relatives, he knows that under the
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Act there will be no return of his contributions. But
unless the Legislature impliedly reserved the right
to deal in any manner it may choose with a member's contributions, he is assured by the Act that
except (1) if he voluntarily withdraws from employment, or (2) if the board will not renew his
contract, or (3) if he dies before retirement, he
cannot be deprived of his interest in the fund."
(Emphasis added.)
It is a well-reasoned definite rule that in the case of
compulsory contribution pension systems it has been widely
held throughout the United States in numerous jurisdictions that there is no right to a refund of the employee's
cont'ributions upon his death, resignation, or dismissal
prio,r to eligibility for pension benefits, absent a provision
in the pension statute authorizing a refund of any of his
contributions. 52 A. L. R. 2d, p. 469. The great weight of
authority is to the effect that the fact that a person has
made compulsory contributions does not give him a vested
right in the pension. 54 A. L. R. 945; 98 A. L. R. 505; 112
A. L. R. 1009; 137 A. L. R. 294. See also Graven v. Scott
(1937), App. Div. 514, 292 N. Y. S. 771 (resignation of
employee); Donovan v. Rye (1946), 271 App. Div. 836, 65
N. Y. S. 2d 737 (dismissal of employee); Richards v.
Geneva (1936), 161 Misc. 572, 292 N. Y. S. 397 (resignation of employee); Genther v. Valentine (1939), 172 Misc.
38, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 935 (death of employee).
There is little doubt, pursuant to the Utah cases heretofore mentioned, that Utah follows the majority rule as to
compulsory contributions to a retirement system and will
not allow any vesting of any interest in the pension or any
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right to contributions unless the statute specifically
vides for vesting or return of any contribution.

pr~

The Utah Legislature, by implication, is assumed to
have knowledge of all similar other acts it has passed in
regard to pension plans. The various types of retirement
systems within the the State are varied and differ widely
as to what becomes of the contributions of the employees,
giving a clear indication that the Legislature was aware
of the problems of contributions and intended a forfeiture
in the Highway Patrol Retirement System.
The policeman's Pension Fund, which was originally
enacted in 1945, in Section 49-5-2, U. C. A. 1953, as
amended, specifically provides that "he shall be paid back"
if he does not qualify for retirement all amounts contributed by the employee.
The Judges' Retirement Act, in Section 49-7-5.6, U. C.
A. 1953, as enacted by the 1963 Legislature, provides that
a person or his beneficiary who does not qualify or become
eligible for retirement will receive his full contributions
back, plus interest.
The Public Employees' Retirement System of the State
of Utah, in Section 49-1-68, U. C. A. 1953, as amended,
which section was passed by the 1961 Legislature, allows
the refund of all contributions made by the employee plus
regular interest thereon upon his not qualifying for retirement, with the additional provision that the employee may
elect to leave his money in the Retirement System and
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remain a member of said System and draw interest on his
money.
The School Employees' Retirement Act, in Section 5329·20, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, provides that contributions shall be paid back for any person who does not qualify for retirement less a withdrawal fee, which is to be set
by the Retirement Board by regulation.
The Firemen's Pension Fund, in Section 49-6-2, U. C.
A. 1953, as amended, is apparently a half-way mark in that
it allows that a fireman, after one year's service and upon
termination of his employment for any cause, shall be refunded by the State Treasurer 60% of the amount contributed by him.
Then, the opposite end of the above mentioned retirement systems, i.e., Policemen's, Judges', and Public Employees' Retirement System, is that no part of the contribution shall be given back if the employee voluntarily resigns from the Highway Patrol Retirement System.
It should be noted that regardless of whether the plaintiffs 'vere advised or not at the commencement of their
employment, any and all amounts contributed to the Highway Patrol Retirement System would be lost or forfeited
unless they continued in such employment for a period of
20 years; and regardless of whether the plaintiffs were
or were not advised by a later meeting in the 1960 actuary
study of an additional charge to change the system in order to allo'v refund of contributions without qualification
for retirement, there is no statutory provision to allow any
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such refund and there is no vesting of any interest pursuant to the Utah law and, therefore, the plaintiffs have
forfeited any and all amounts paid into the program.
Even though the law generally abhors forfeitures and
statutes may be construed strictly to prevent them, the
courts must give to statutes that provide for a forfeiture
such a construction that will be consistent with justice,
reason and the legislative intent to protect the fund and
keep it actuarially sound. Datta v. Stabb, 344 P. 2d 977,
173 C. A. 2d 613.
In a well reasoned Oklahoma case, Pirkey v. State, ex
rel. Martin, 327 P. 2d 463, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
stated:
"Courts will not force on a forfeiture statute
a construction which amounts to a reading into the
statute of provisions not inserted therein by the
Legislature.''
CONCLUSION
The Utah statutes do not allow any refund of the
Utah Highway Patrol Fund to be made other than those
specified in the statutes, as indicated, and the decision of
the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General,
RONALD N. SPRATLING, JR.,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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